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ABSTRACT

The objective of this thesis is to address the nature
of Japanese-American bilateral relations in the twentieth
century.

An adaptation of George Modelski's theory of

global long cycles is the tool used to analyze the
relationship.

This adaptation gives a broader evaluation

of the relationship and provides a basis for predicting
possible economic shifts.

The focus of the analysis is an

exploration of whether changes occurring in the post-1980s
lay the ground work for a new stage of friction similar to
that of the interwar period.

Specifically, the argument

is that the United States is in a period of decline and
that Japan is vying for the role of Pacific leader in the
twenty-first century.

An examination is made of the

relative decline of American power in the Pacific and the
challenge posed by other actors, specifically Japan, to
the United States' governments role as the Pacific's
leader and its main power.
struggle is taking shape.

The nature of a possible
Therefore,

it is imperative

that one examine the current period of instability and the
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last period of instability to determine the possible roots
of the next cycle's conflict.

Whether Japan emerges as

the next Pacific leader or the cyclical pattern of world
leadership holds true at the bilateral level, for the
coming century, a period of change, instability and
challenge is underway in Japanese-American relations.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to determine the nature
of a possible reemergence of change,

friction, and

instability in United States-Japan bilateral relations.
An examination of the United States-Japan relationship in
the twentieth century with respect to the Pacific is made
according to an adaptation of George Modelski's theory of
long cycles in global politics.

By adapting Modelski's

theory of global long cycles to explore bilateral
relations, one is able to broadly evaluate bilateral
relationships by accounting for economic shifts and their
effect.

It is also one possible approach to explaining

the relationship.

The rationale for comparing the

interwar period to the post-1980s is this: if one can
understand the causes of the last United States-Japan
conflict, one can determine the possible basis for the
next such conflict.
According to Modelski, every century experiences a
cycle of four distinct stages: conflict, hegemonic
leadership, delegitimation, and deconcentration.

v

Because

the bilateral relationship of the United States'
government with the Japanese government has parallels to
the theory of global long cycles, one can use an
adaptation of the theory to determine if it will explain
the relationship and its changing nature.

Explanations of

these stages are in terms of the United States'
government's role.

The instability which characterized

the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s epitomizes the
last fourth stage.

In this stage, the United States and

Japan are Pacific powers, struggling to clarify their
leadership roles.

In the second stage, the United States'

government's role as the unquestioned leader of the
Pacific typifies hegemonic leadership and stability
(1946-1968).

The emerging instability of the late 1960s

to early 1980s is an illustration of the third stage,
delegitimation.

The Vietnam War, the collapse of Cambodia

and Laos, and the emergence of Japan as an economic rival
in the Pacific, as well as the growing inability of the
United States1 government to deal with the needs of the
region denote this instability.

The economic and

political collapse of the status quo and the decline of
the United States as the Pacific's leader (1980s to the
present) characterize the fourth stage, deconcentration.
Specifically, this stage addresses the changing nature of
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the power system from that of military power to economic
power within the Pacific.
Given these time frames, stage four of the first long
cycle in United States-Japan relations deals with the
emergence of the United States as a new Pacific power and
Japan as cocontender for recognition as the Pacific's
leader.

The first stage of the current cycle is that of

conflict, World War II.,.
periods when:

Stages two and three concern the

(1) the United States is the unquestioned

regional leader and Japan its compliant ally,

(2) states

in the region begin to rebel against the status quo, and
(3) Japan emerges as a trade giant.

Finally, stage four

covers the collapse of the status quo and the open
challenge posed by Japan to the United States'

leadership

in Pacific trade and finance.

friction,

Because change,

and instability mark when cycles emerge and conclude, the
emphasis of this thesis is on the fourth stage of the
first and second long cycles in United States-Japan
relations.
covered.

However,

stages two and three are briefly

Additionally, an exploration is made of the

various scenarios for the end of the current long cycle.
Before elaborating upon Modelski's stages,
to clarify terms used throughout this thesis.

it is best
"Power" is

defined as possession of control, authority, or influence
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over others; one having such power, specifically a
sovereign state; implied possession or ability to wield
force, permissive authority, or substantial influence.
The definition of "supremacy" is that of absolute
authority or power.

National security interests are

defined as the economic, market, or trade issues which
affect national economic welfare of a sovereign state.
Additionally, the unit of analysis by which actions are
measured is that of a sovereign state responding to
economic and market realities.
With respect to stage four of the first long cycle in
United States-Japan relations, the premise is that
economic and military needs precipitated the Washington
Naval Conference (1922) and laid the groundwork for
increased conflict between the United States' and Japanese
governments.

A review of the issues leading to the

conference and its aftermath covers the effect economic
and market forces had on foreign policy choices.
emphasis are;

Areas of

(1) the degree to which national security

considerations influenced American and Japanese positions
at the Washington Naval Conference, and (2) the degree to
which the Washington conference realized national
interests.

As an integral part of this stage, the events which
led to the London Naval Conference (1930), its goals,
problems, and its effect on Japan are addressed.

its

Finally,

the past fourth stage is compared to the current period of
Japanese and American relations.

This comparison is with

respect to trade interests in the Pacific and each
nation's pursuit of domestic economic survival to see if
it supports the premise that a new fourth cycle is
underway.

The next possible option is that Japan could

emerge as the new Pacific leader.

A second option is that

the United States could regain its ascendancy in the
Pacific, much as Great Britain did at the global level in
the nineteenth century.

The third option is that a new

world system could emerge which marks the end of the last
500 years of long cycles and which requires a new model.

ix

1

CHAPTER 1

This chapter explains the premises and the theory
used to examine "the Japanese-American bilateral
relationship.

Additionally, one finds a brief review of

the relevant literature with explanations of its
contributions and limitations.

Finally, an examination of

George Modelski's theory of long cycles is made and an
adaptation used to explore the changing nature of
Japanese-American power relations.

This adaptation

amplifies the economic reasons for change in the
relationship.
The basic premise of this thesis is : (1) there are
dynamic changes in the Japanese-American relationship,

(2)

these changes concern the role of trade in determining the
future course of the relationship,
cyclical in nature,

(3) these changes are

(4) the Japanese-American relationship

is in the final stage of deconcentration, and (5) an
i'

examination of the interwar period enables one to form
certain assumptions concerning the nature of the
Japanese-American governmental relationship prior to the
last hegemonic conflict.

Given these assumptions,

it is
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possible that the nature of Japanese-American governmental
relations and each nation's role in the Pacific is
changing.

Furthermore; it possible that Japan may assume

primacy in the Pacific, especially with respect to trade,
and that the next long cycle's conflict stage may evolve
around the issue of which nation controls Pacific trade.
To address the nature of the Japanese-American
relationship,

especially its economic nature, several of

the leading theories in the field were considered.
Although Hans Morgenthau's In Defense of the National
Interest and Politics Among Nations. Robert Gilpin's
Global Politics, and Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of
the Great Powers contributed various ways to analyze the
relations among states, the theory of long cycles
propounded by George Modelski in Exploring Long Cycles and
Long Cycles in Global Politics allowed for a more thorough
explanation of economic factors and the role of economics
in bilateral relations.

Beginning with Morgenthau, one

finds an examination of these works to explain why the
theory of long cycles best suited this thesis.
According to Morgenthau's vision of power politics
and the balance of power, the United States' government
improvises its policies as it goes along instead of
determining what are its true foreign policy interests.
It "[invokes] some abstract moral principle" instead of

s
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marshalling "public opinion in support of war and warlike
policies," thus leading to its own failures in foreign
policy.

When it comes to American relations with the

Pacific in the twentieth century, Morgenthau states they
are:

(1) neither "obvious nor clearly defined,"

(2) fail

to express the national interest, and (3) overly
moralistic.

2

American foreign policy in the Pacific is

seen as still oriented toward the concept of the Open Door
with China.

It is basically a balance of power

relationship whereby China balances American security
interests against the former Soviet Union.

3

Very simply,

the United States relies on power politics, an inherently
practical and simple way to achieve its goals, but couches
its demands in a political and moralistic language.4
Morgenthau argues that "self-preservati'on is the first
duty of a nation;" therefore, the United States must act
in its best interests without regard to moral principles.
While these principles are correct insofar as they
address the bipolar world of the Cold War, they do not
allow room for changes to or the dissolution of the status
quo.

The Cold War Soviet-American governmental

relationship shaped Morgenthau1s argument.

He did not

foresee the rise of the Japanese nation as a possible
contender for Pacific leadership.

Everything is tied to

balancing Soviet moves, especially in Europe.

Even the

4

role of China, with nary a glance to Japan,

is tied to how

it can balance the Soviet government so that American
security needs can be met.

Morgenthau did not consider

the possibility that the Japanese government could act
independently of the United States or that it could
eventually no longer need American protection.

Morgenthau

did not foresee the impact vast wealth, extensive
industrialization,
state relations.

and burgeoning trade have on current
There is also no accounting for the

possibility that the Cold War equation could change or
that economic conditions, especially with respect to
trade, could cause a change in the existing order or
contribute to instability in the Pacific.
Turning to Robert Gilpin's and Paul Kennedy's
arguments, they are relevant and interesting.

According

to Gilpin's rational choice (economic) theory,

individual

actors are rational and try to achieve maximum
satisfaction of their respective values and interests at
minimum cost to themselves.

The rationality of the actor

is tied solely to the attempt to reach a goal, not to
whether the'goal is achieved.

Thus, an actor will pursue

an issue until costs and benefits are equalized.

Drawing

upon this explanation of what amounts to a marginal
utility (Pareto) curve, Gilpin extrapolates this to form a
general theory of social and political change.

This

s
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general theory is then applied to international political
change and focuses on how technical and economic changes
effect power and individual interests.
Bearing this in mind, a state attempts to change the
political system to increase its relative power and to
decrease the cost of its political arrangements until
equilibrium is reached.

Once it achieves equilibrium, the

state will then try to change the existing political
5
system.
For a state to destabilize the bipolar system
and lead to hegemonic conflict it must see:

(1) the

failure of one power to play its balancing role,

(2) a

third power arise and upset the bipolar balance of power,
(3) the international political system break into two
hostile camps,

(4) the major powers become entangled in

the ambitions and problems of (a) minor' power(s), and (5)
a loss of control over economic, political, and social
developments.
Although Gilpin makes a cogent argument for economic
determinism, there are some shortcomings to his theory.
To begin with, actors do not always behave rationally or
achieve equilibrium.

Actors may accept trade-offs on

maximizing their utility to achieve non-economic goals
such as prestige, much as Japan did at the Washington and
London Naval Conferences in the interwar period.
also the inherent assumption, given the context of

There is
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Soviet-American relations in existence at the time Gilpin
wrote Global Politics, that although one party may weaken,
it will not collapse.

Gilpin makes no allowance for the

total dissolution of a state.

While a third party could

emerge, Japan did not upset the bipolar balance of power
as Gilpin's theory states a third party would— Japan was a
staunch ally of "the United States against the Soviet
Union.

The international political system has not

remained in two hostile ideological camps, communism is
dead and multipolarity is more the rule.

Finally, the

degree and kind of loss of control over economic,
political, and social developments is not really defined.
As for Kennedy, the historical perspective of The
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers provided a wealth of
historical data and closely paralleled long cycle theory
on many points.

However, his broad-brush approach of

addressing the rise of the West as the broker of power
internationally focuses almost exclusively on coalition
warfare.

Although it addresses the interaction of

economics and military strength, it is mainly from a
Western perspective.

His main point, that

the relative strengths of the leading nations in world
affairs never remain constant, . . . because of the
uneven rate of growth among different societies and of
the technological and organizational breakthroughs
which bring a greater advantage to one society than tg
another,
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is valid but Kennedy only used it to address Western
powers.

Kennedy himself acknowledges this limitation by

stating:

the history of the rise and later fall of the leading
countries in the Great Power system since the advance
of western Europe in the sixteenth century — that is,
of nations such as Spain, the Netherlands, France, the
British Empire, and currently the United States —
shows a very significant correlation over the longer
term between production and revenue-raising capacities
on the one hand and military strength on the other.
^

With this acknowledgment of his look at Western

*“

history in the modern era, he also admits he was "tempted
from the historian's profession into the uncertain world
of speculation upon the future, just as the nineteenth
century historian Leopold von Ranke did in an essay on the
Q

great powers of his era."

While Kennedy used his data

effectively to present an historical account of modern
world (i.e., Western) history, there was no scientific
definition of what constitutes a state, what factors will
influence a state's relationship to another state, how a
state will act, and what kinds of policy decisions the
state will make.

The approach was also too far ranging to

address Japanese-American trade relations in sufficient
detail for this thesis.

Kennedy's examination of the rise

and fall of great powers is an historical perspective of
the evolution and decline of powers.

It does not use

8

scientific reasoning to test an hypothesis as a political
scientist does.
While none of these works focused on economics to the
extent necessary for an examination of twentieth century
J-apanese-American bilateral relations, they enabled me to
choose the best tool for the job.

Although the argument

presented here concerns bilateral relations, an adaptation
of long cycles theory is an intriguing way to explain the
relationship.
According to Modelski,

long cycles explain the

rationale for world war and the nature of orderly
9
succession.

This thesis explores possible Japanese

governmental succession of the United States as the
Pacific's leader and its assumption of primacy in the
bilateral relationship.

According to Modelski, a long

cycle is the "rhythm of global politics" and the social
system.10

These cycles are dynamic occurrences which are

part of modern society.

11

To qualify as such, a long

cycle must go through four stages:

global war, world

power (leadership/stability), delegitimation (decline),
and deconcentration (challenge/conflict).
During global war, the entire order is in chaos as the
various powers use military and/or trade warfare to
determine the global leader.

In the victor's period as

world power, there is a period of hegemonic stability

9

supplied and defined by the world leader for the entire
world.

During delegitimation, one hears the initial

rumblings of instability as the states question and
challenge the validity of the world power's leadership.
During deconcentration, the world leader cannot meet the
stability needs of the system it created.

Other major

powers challenge’ it for the role of world leader.

This is

the final stage before the entire system plunges into
chaos in a new global war in the first stage of the next
long cycle.

The cycle can also exhibit one or a

combination of three types of global politics: polarity,
coalition, or macroconflict.

12

During a long cycle, polarity occurs when the long
cycle moves from low— to high— to low— power
concentrations which correspond to sea power on the world
level.

Coalition occurs when a core alliance has a large

group of affiliated states which follow its lead.

The

characteristics of this coalition are stability and
continuity for the system (provided by the core alliance)
until the next global war.

Conflict occurs during

deconcentration of the core alliance.

Through long cycle

analysis, one can foresee approximately when a conflict
may occur and how it may impact the political and economic
power of the major powers.

13

10

During the modern period,

five distinct global cycles

occurred:

Portugese, Dutch, British I, British II, and

American.

As one may argue, the current bilateral cycle

may end and a third long cycle may occur in the next
century.

Within this modified framework, it is possible

that the current period of bilateral instability reflects
a possible challenge posed by Japan to the United States.
The Pacific leader realizes that while it still possesses
significant resources, problems occur because of the need
to address changing economic dynamics.

14

In other words,

the Pacific economy (which is based on trade and
multinational corporations)

has functional difficulties

under American leadership.

Restrictive regulations and a

paucity of capital available for local and Pacific
investment account for part of the problem.

The other

problem is that of security and stability.
While an understanding of economics is critical to the
concept of long cycles, comprehension of the affect the
distribution of naval power has on states is just as
important.

According to Modelski, naval power is the key

indicator of global reach and power status because sea
power serves as the "stabilizer of the modern status
quo."

15

The world power is the leader of the global

political system because it has the military superiority
and the capacity for global reach necessary to secure

11

trade and shipping lanes.

The critical factor permitting

global reach and the ability to support a navy is the
nation's wealth.
Because trade is the means by which wealth is brought
into a country through the exchange of goods and services,
it is also the component which requires naval protection.
To ensure safe and free passage of goods, and of the
merchant vessels carrying them, a state must possess some
way to protect its trade.

Logically, a state must have a

navy with sufficient size and force to meet the safety
needs of its mercantile interests, thus ensuring trade
continues and expands.

At the same time, a poor state

cannot afford to protect its trade interests via a navy;
therefore,

a rich state with dynamic foreign trade is the

state which provides the protection of a navy.

The world

leader is the sea power which emerges at the end of a
global war (economic or military), with sea power as the
key measure of its "capacity to lead, organize and support
the global system."16
If the theory of long cycles holds true at the
bilateral lfevel, the next challenger and rival in a
possible hegemonic war with the United States will be a
maritime trading power.
this requirement.

Japan is one state which meets

Japan has the largest maritime fleet in

the Pacific as well as the third largest outlay on

12

military expenditures in the world.

Following this

approach, Japan is a possible contender for the role of
Pacific leadership.
When viewed within the context of the long cycle of
naval and economic power, the current bilateral
Japanese-American relationship follows a pattern similar
to the long cycles shown in the following table:

CONFLICT
WORLD POWER
1494-1516
1516-1539
ITALIANPORTUGAL
INDIAN
OCEAN WARS

DELEGITIMATION DECONCENTRATION
1540-1560
1560-1580
PORTUGESE
SPAIN
CYCLE

1580-1609
SPANISHDUTCH WAR

1609-1639
HOLLAND

1640-1660
DUTCH CYCLE

1660-1688
FRANCE

1688-1713
LOUIS XIV
WARS

1714-1739
BRITAIN I

1740-1763
FIRST BRITISH
CYCLE

1764-1792
FRANCE

1792-1815 1815-1849
FRENCH
BRITAIN II
REVOLUTIONNAPOLEONIC
WARS

1850-1873
1874-1914
SECOND BRITISH GERMANY
CYCLE

1917-1945
WORLD WAR
I/II

1968-1982
AMERICAN
CYCLE

1945-1968
UNITED
STATES

1983-2013 (?)
JAPAN
17

Viewed within this theoretical context, the conclusion of
World War II catapulted the United States to the position
of Pacific leader.

The height of the American era was

1947-68. The beginnings of decline and delegitimation
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occurred in 1968 with the escalation of the Vietnam War,
the change in the United Nations to a Third World forum,
the 197 3 Arab oil embargo, and the communist challenge (up
through the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989) .

The

current period, that of the onset of deconcentration and
conflict,

is marked by trade and political tensions the

United States and other states and the European Community
at the global level.
Translated to the bilateral context of United
States-Japan relations, the first and second cycle look
something like this:

CONFLICT
1846-1873
MANIFEST
DESTINY/
TRADE WAR

HEGEMONY
1873-1890
UNITED
STATES I

DELEGITIMATION
1890-1914
FIRST AMERICAN
CYCLE

DECONCENTRATION
1914-1931
JAPAN

1931-1945
WORLD
WAR I

1945-1968
UNITED
STATES II

1968-1982
SECOND
AMERICAN CYCLE

1982-2013 (?)
JAPAN

In the first long cycle, American efforts to
dominate Pacific trade with Japan (to the exclusion of
British merchants) prompted a fierce struggle in the
Japanese government over American access and influence in
Japan.

American naval, trade, and security interests

under Manifest Destiny prompted continued efforts to
breach Japanese isolationism.

In stage two, the American

navy and businesses had free reign in Japan.

In stage

14

three, the Japanese government and industry reasserted
themselves via a program of rapid modernization and
territorial expansion.

In stage four, the Japanese

military, business community, and government openly
challenged the American navy and business interests in the
Pacific.
During the current cycle, World War II marked stage
one.

Stages two and three parallel the global stages of

Modelski's American cycle.

Finally, trade and political

tensions between the United States' and Japanese
governments characterize stage four of the current
bilateral relationship.
While conflict is generally in the form of global
military warfare, the breakdown of the global system can
take the form of trade warfare or trade’ friction.

18

While

the military element is important in the overall equation
of leadership,

it is primarily the economic strength of

the state which enables it to have the protection of a
strong navy.

Therefore,

if a state is in decline due to

diminishment of its market share and weakening of its
economic health,
Specifically,

it will fight to protect its resources.

it will engage in trade warfare to preserve

its markets domestically and abroad.
restrictive taxes,
practices

It will use

import barriers, and unfair trade

(dumping, selling below cost, etc.).

15

Prior to this phase, the emerging power (Japan)
clarifies and consolidates its position during the stages
of delegitimation and deconcentration through exploitation
of the very means which brought the old power (the United
States) to its position of leadership.

During this period

of consolidation, the emerging state relies on the
protective mantle of the reigning power's navy to protect
its own interests without going to the expense of building
a large, strong navy.

It relies on that state's ability

to keep trade lanes and ports open to take advantage of
markets.
Applied to the Pacific, the Japanese government took
advantage of American naval hegemony to further its trade
interests much as the United States' government did with
respect to Great Britain's navy through- the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.

In this period, the American

navy was fairly weak while the British navy was the
largest and strongest in the world as well as in the
Pacific.

By depending upon the British navy to police

Pacific waters, American businesses traded in areas the
British navy controlled.

The Open Door policy of equal

access to the China trade typified this symbiotic
relationship between American businesses and British naval
power in the Pacific.

16

In this transitional stage, of deconcentration, the
international order becomes volatile, social unrest
occurs, the GNP falls, unemployment and inflation
escalate, and new economic and politico-military powers
arise to form a multi-polar system.

19

Because hegemonic

stability lasts only as long as power rests in the hands
of one state, the international system and economic order
remain legitimate and stable only as long as that state
maintains its economic and military capacity and will to
act.

Once the state loses its capacity, whether through

technology transfer, over-commitment to policies and
principles, or lack of dynamic action, power
deconcentrates,

free markets collapse, and closed economic

zones emerge. 20
In the United States-Japan context', one can see this
occurring by examining the scaling down of the American
military, the Japanese technology advantage, the inability
of the United States' government to act unilaterally to
enforce its will, the Japanese government's expanding
diplomatic overtures in the Pacific, and the relative
closing of Pacific markets to American goods.

For

example, the drawdown of American military personnel to a
smaller force in both the active and reserve sectors
points to a fundamental inability to support the continued
economic drain of a large military on the national

\
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treasury.

The technological edge of Japan in fields such

as robotics, bio-technology, semi-conductors, and
electro-optics enables them to make inroads into existing
markets such as consumer electronics

(televisions,

computers, games) and create new ones without much
competition.
Additionally, the fact that the United States'
government had to ask for money from coalition countries
in order to wage war against Iraq further underscores its
weakening control and inability to act unilaterally.
Finally, the Japanese government's increasing role in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the
Cambodian peace accords,

as well as the ability of

Japanese businesses to penetrate and dominate Pacific
markets,

further accents the current de'concentration of

American military, political, and economic power.

This

fourth stage of increased instability and deconcentration
is laying the foundation for the first stage of the next
long cycle.
While the modern world system is composed of global
political, global economic, and cultural subsystems, the
global political system is the most important and is
closely intertwined with the global economic system.
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This is true because the world leader shapes the global
political system through economic means.

This is possible
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only if it can afford to provide for the public good at
its own expense and in accordance with its guiding
ideology or principles.

On the bilateral level, with the

United States' government in serious financial
difficulties,

it is no longer able to provide the

stability necessary to Japan's (or the Pacific's)
and economic needs.

security

It can neither fund a large navy nor

grant large loans to the Japanese government and industry
(or to developing nations).

This ability to underwrite

the region is crucial to maintaining hegemony because the
leading state requires international

(regional) stability

in order for its political and economic needs to be met.
According to Modelski,

if a state cannot buy

stability through the use of its navy or the promise of
financial aid to other states, the international peace
begins to crumble.

States dissolve alliances and shipping

becomes endangered.

If this is the case, the United

States' government must rely upon the Japanese government
to step forward and lend support to shape the Pacific's
political system.

This is typical during stage four of

long cycle analysis.

It again points to the possible

nature of the next cycle's initial conflict— a struggle
for control and leadership.
Viewed from the context of long cycles, each cycle
occurs every 100 to 120 years after some form of global
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conflict.

Based on the regional context of the United

States-Japan relationship, this conflict could take the
form of trade warfare.

Each phase of the cycle— conflict,

leadership, decline, and challenge— lasts 25 to 30 years
and the United States1 government appears to be in the
fourth stage of this cycle.
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When the current or old

leader no longer has a strong economy,
weakened and delegitimized.

its leadership is

This appears to be what is

happening now to the United States1 position in the
Pacific.

A specific example of this weakness is the

recent trade talks failure.

Despite President George Bush,

and the chairmen of Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler
going to Japan to try and coerce the Japanese government
and business leaders into granting concessions, nothing
concrete happened.

The only thing that became clear from

the visit was that the United States' President, arguably
the most powerful man in the world, could not get his
demands met by an erstwhile ally— his power and prestige
were insufficient.
Based on long cycle theory,

if Japan succeeds the

United Statfes as the Pacific leader in the next long
cycle,

it must have similar characteristics.

If regional

powers have the same characteristics as world powers, they
must have:
the world,

(1) stable domestic politics and be open to
(2) a strong, dynamic economy,

(3) some form of

20

politico-strategic organization capable of exerting global
power (a strong navy), and (4) the characteristics of an
island or a peninsular state.
While air power is an important part of modern
military force projection, naval power is still the most
flexible as it is self-supporting.

Naval power also has

the added benefit of having submarines and aircraft
carriers, assets capable of operating autonomously.

Air

power by itself is not as responsive as naval power.

It

requires a massive support base and long supply lines if
it is to operate in forward deployed areas.

Nuclear

forces are not viable in this equation either, as they are
impractical to use, warheads would have to be
reprogrammed,

and assets would have to be within striking

distance of the target area.

Nuclear weapons have the

drawback of irradiating and rendering useless the area one
wants to control and economically exploit.

Additionally,

the new power is an ally of the existing leader, despite
challenging that leadership.
If one transfers world leadership characteristics to
bilateral leadership ones, the Japanese government becomes
a logical contender for leadership.

Japan has a

homogeneous, stable governmental system and is
increasingly participatory in Pacific economic and
political forums such as the Association of Southeast

^
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Asian Nations

(ASEAN).

There is no doubt as to its

economic viability or dynamism and, through the Ministry
for International Trade and Industry(MITI), the Japanese
government exerts its financial power throughout the
Pacific.

Japan is also a seafaring island nation and the

United States' government's closest ally in the Pacific.
With these power characteristics applied to Japan,

it

is not difficult to cast it as the United States'
potential successor.

Conversely,

opposing or rival powers

are generally continental states, have significant
political and social divisions, a large economic capacity
(though not as large as the existing world power), an
inconsistent politico-strategic organization, and lack the
knowledge and ability to manage a world system.
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These

characteristics are applicable to the former Soviet Union
(the new Commonwealth of Independent States)

in its quest

for the role of global and European leader.
Returning to Modelski, yet another factor in long
cycles is the direction in which power moves.

Power

shifts to an area where global actors and organizations
concentrate’to form an environment favorable to high
levels of investment and innovation.
modern history,
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In the case of

leadership and power shift from one naval

and trading power to the next.

This pattern of following

capital and technology from one state to the next points
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all the more directly to the Pacific and Japan.

The

region is both economically and technologically dynamic,
especially Japan.

The economic and technological base of

the United States appears to be lagging behind that of
Japan.
While one can use the analytical framework of long
cycles to explain Japanese-American bilateral
relationship, there are some limits to this theory.
According to Modelski, ,the four phases fall within a 100
to 120 year long cycle and last 25 to 30 years.

However,

it seems these phases occur closer together and are more
concentrated.

Despite this drawing together or

compression of time allotted to phases, Modelski tries to
account for it by allowing phases to overlap with no clear
break.

Allowing cycles to overlap makes it difficult to

logically trace periodic developments within cycles.
Another problem is the shifting of patterns of stability
and instability seem to occur much more rapidly.

While

this may in fact be happening, the phases of long cycles
are still applicable to the Japanese-American equation as
the root causes for stability or instability are still
valid.

Bearing these limitations in mind, long cycle

analysis is the most comprehensive strategy for evaluating
twentieth century Japanese-American relations.
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Given the nature of long cycles and of the transition
from delegitimation to deconcentration,

it is possible the

United States' government may experience another period of
bilateral leadership much as Great Britain did at the
global level in the nineteenth century.

If the United

States' government is to enter a second phase of hegemonic
leadership in the Pacific it must meet two challenges.
These challenges are:

(1) Can the United States preserve

the balance between its defined requirements and the means
available to meet these self-defined goals? and (2) Can
the United States preserve its technological and economic
power bases as regional production patterns shift?
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By reviewing the relevant literature and selecting
the theory of long cycles, one established the premise
that the current American cycle is in its fourth stage.
One reviewed the four phases of a long cycle, the
preceding four long cycles in global history, and the last
bilateral long cycle.

An examination of the nature of

hegemonic leadership and stability, the origins of
delegitimation and deconcentration, and the effect of
economic factors on all of these followed.

Additionally,

one explored the characteristics of a world leader and the
nature of conflict with respect to Japanese-American
relations.
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The main points of this chapter are:

(1) one can

adapt global long cycle analysis to explore bilateral
relations,

(2) parallels exist between the fourth stage of

the first long cycle in Japanese-American relations and
the current such cycle, and (3) long cycle analysis
provides the best means of defining the changing nature of
Japanese-American relations.

\
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CHAPTER 2

In this chapter, the initial phase of the
Japanese-American relationship is examined within the
context of the interwar period.

Emphasis is on the nature

of conflicting national interests.

The 1922 Washington

and 1930 London Naval Conferences highlight the first
bilateral cycle of American deconcentration.

This fourth

stage of deconcentration demonstrates the degree to which
economic interests dictated military positions.

An

examination of the increasing impact of economic problems
at home and abroad demonstrate the degree to which
economic considerations heightened friction between the
Japanese and United States' governments.

Territorial

expansion, trade practices, the Great Depression, and
national interests define the basis of deconcentration.
According to Modelski, the fourth stage of every cycle
exhibits some form of challenge.

Within the context of

Japanese-American trade relations, the interwar period
demonstrates this fourth stage of deconcentration.

With

the advent of World War I, the United States and Japan
emerged as new Pacific powers.

Both nations had strong

26

economies, vibrant economic growth rates, sizeable navies,
a growing international trade, and long-term interests in
the Pacific.

For example, by 1929 Japanese export trade

totaled Y2.604 trillion compared to just Y213 billion in
1900.

2 (5

Japanese steel manufacturing alone grew from

225,000 tons in 1913 to 2,034,000 tons in 1929.27

The

manufacturing sector virtually doubled its production
between 1925 and 1938 from 313 to 600 percent of
capacity.
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Additionally, Japanese banks such the

Industrial Bank of Japan invested in China and the South
Pacific, especially in "enterprises deemed to be of
national importance."

29

As for the United States'

business sector, accounted for 31.4 percent of the world's
manufacturing by 1938.
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It spent approximately $1,131

trillion on defense in 1938 alone and functioned at 523
percent of its industrial potential.
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Both nations were

also allies of Great Britain, the leader of the nineteenth
century world, and both strove to replace Great Britain as
the Pacific's leader.

To do so, economic growth, market

access, and trade expansion were paramount.

Under a

protective wall of tariffs in place since the 1850s, the
American economy expanded to where American productivity
rivaled the combined capacity of Great Britain, France,
and Germany; necessitating its further expansion in the
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region.

The United States also took over Pacific markets

Great Britain dominated for a century.
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Basically, anything the United States' government
wished to achieve in the Pacific could not happen without
considering the Japanese government's response.
Conversely, the Japanese government could not act in the
Pacific without considering the American government's
reaction.
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In 1922, the Pacific experienced tensions

brought about by a naval armaments race and a period of
economic downturn.

The major cause of these tensions was

the evolution of the United States and Japan as Pacific
naval and economic powers, coupled with the disintegration
of Great Britain's naval and economic supremacy in the
Pacific at the end of World War I.

The Pacific region's

trade and security were of particular importance,
especially as they pertained to the American and Japanese
governments' respective foreign policy actions.
Therefore, an examination of the Washington Naval
Conference is necessary to determine the degree to which
national security considerations influenced the American
and Japanese governments' positions.

Different notions of

security were the essential cause of friction and of
failure for the Washington Naval Conference.
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The

security interests of the United States' government were
quite different from those of the Japanese government.

As

28

the preeminent trading nation in the world, the United
States' government's concerns centered around trade.

That

trade required a naval component capable of defending
global commerce, supporting the Monroe Doctrine, and
.
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upholding American sovereignty in the Pacific.

The

United States had to achieve naval parity with Great
Britain and to maintain its naval and economic superiority
over Japan to defend its Pacific trade interests.

Naval

expansion was the primary way to ensure continued American
control over Philippine and Southeast Asian trade lanes.
Although strategic and technological advantages were
the United States' delegation's stated reasons for
attending the Washington Naval Conference, economic issues
were the true rationale.

Additionally, the United States'

Navy needed to break the existing British-Japanese naval
alliance in order to eliminate an unfavorable military
balance in the Pacific.

Unless it broke the alliance, the

British and Japanese navies could potentially exclude the
United States' merchant marine from participating in the
lucrative Pacific trade.36

As long as the Anglo-Japanese

alliance held, the United States' Commonwealth of the
Philippines could be attacked and seized by either by the
British navy from Singapore and Hong Kong or by the
Japanese navy from islands seized from Germany during
World War I.37
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While these issues necessitated prompt action, the
American government's official goals were:
limitation of naval armaments,

(1) the

(2) the establishment of

rules governing the use of new weapons, and (3) the
l-imitation of land armaments.
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By limiting naval

armaments, the relatively undeveloped American navy
effectively halted expansion by the British and Japanese
navies in areas where the American navy was weak.

This

gave the American navy a chance to catch up and, most
importantly, the ability to protect its Pacific
territories.

Rules governing the usage of new weapons

also gave the American navy time to formulate plans for
the defeat or rebuff of any potential aggressive actions
against its important commercial holdings in the Pacific.
The same applied for the land armaments' limitations.

The

added impetus of the United States' Army's long line of
supplies dictated requirements for the protection of the
Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands.

The unstated

purpose for the United States' government convening the
conference was to:
military alliance,

(1) cancel the British-Japanese
(2) resolve the question of what to do

with the Pacific islands seized by the Japanese military
from the German government during World War I, and (3)
halt the Japanese military's imperialist aspirations in
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China and Siberia.
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The rationale behind these goals was

simple.
If the United States' government could cancel the
Anglo-Japanese alliance,

it could consolidate and

gradually expand its mercantile interests in the Pacific.
By resolving whether Japan could keep islands seized in
World War I from Germany, the United States' government
hoped to contain Japanese territorial and economic
expansion in the region by giving the Japanese government
a non-threatening outlet for territorial and trade
expansion.

This outlet would also help to curb Japanese

industrial and territorial expansion into China, and
benefit American business interests.

Finally, by ending

further Japanese expansion in China and Siberia, the
American business community had continued access to the
potentially huge Chinese market.

Furthermore, to continue

to pursue its Open Door policy in China, the United
States' government had to have a navy capable of defeating
both the British and Japanese navies simultaneously.
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For the Japanese government, security interests were
more complicated.

The Japanese government faced a rapidly

increasing population and insufficient arable land to
support its population's food requirements.

The Japanese

government looked to the Asian mainland for continued
growth and survival.
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The Japanese government believed

v
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it needed land to ease growing population strains, to
provide sufficient food to support a burgeoning
population, and to provide raw materials to fuel its
industrial growth.

The Japanese government saw

colonization of Siberia and Manchuria as the way to do
so.
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The Japanese government and Army also saw mainland

possessions, Korea (acquired in 1894 from China) and the
Shantung Peninsula

(acquired in during World War I from

Germany), as critical to Japan's external defense and
long-term economic interests as they provided markets for
its goods

43

.

This was especially true after American

Congressional tariff restrictions virtually killed off
Japanese business'

important North American trade.
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The

Japanese government also worried about the presence of
American military bases in the Philippines, Guam, and
Hawaii as well as British military bases in Hong Kong and
Singapore.

The Japanese government and military

leadership saw arms negotiations as a way to prevent the
American and British military forces from challenging
Japan's position in the Pacific.
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Thus the Japanese delegation had several objectives.
The Japanese government sought:

(1) guaranteed

international security and peace,
limitations,

(2) mandatory arms

(3) settlement of the Far East question,

recognition of racial equality,

(4)

and (5)augmentation of its
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national prestige.
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The Japanese government hoped

negotiations with the United States' government would
break its alliance with Great Britain and forestall
expansion of the British mercantile and naval presence in
the Pacific.

The continued British military and

mercantile presence in the Pacific was detrimental to the
Japanese government's long-term economic and military
go a l s .
During the conference, the Japanese government agreed
to return the Shantung Peninsula to the Chinese
government.

47

The Japanese delegation also promised to

evacuate Japanese troops and civilians from Russian
territory seized in the Russo-Japanese War.

Additionally,

the delegation agreed to prevent the further territorial
disintegration of China and to limit military armaments.
These concessions were significant in that the Japanese
government virtually agreed to expand no further in China,
thus curtailing its access to the Chinese market.

This

meant that Japanese businesses would have to look
elsewhere for both supplies and consumers.

By agreeing to

the armament limitations, the Japanese government also
accepted a relatively inferior position in the Pacific as
its navy would only have local hegemony in Japanese
territorial waters.
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In the armaments limitations treaty, capital ships
(i.e. battleships) were limited to a 5:5:3 ratio (five for
Great Britain,

five for the United States, and three for

Japan) with the guarantee to the Japanese government that
no islands held by the American or British governments
would be fortified.

In effect, the American navy received

tacit permission to replace the British navy as the
regional peace keeper and master of the southern Pacific
trade lanes.

At the same time, the Japanese navy received

de facto control of the northern Pacific trade lanes.
Additionally, the United States' and Japanese governments
achieved a better working relationship.
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Despite these achievements, no limitations were set on
auxiliary vessels,

land, or air forces.
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This left the

door open for possible aggression and continued expansion
in the region by all parties.

Anti-Japanese trade and

immigration policies were not revised by the United
States' government.

This allowed room among the Japanese

military and people for resentment and the need for future
expansion on the Chinese mainland to ease population
strains.
cruisers.

The arms race shifted from capital ships to
The United States' government was still unable

to protect its territories in the Pacific as it could not
build defenses under the treaty.

There was also no way to

force the British navy to maintain parity with the
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American navy, further fueling doubts about the United
States' government's peaceful intentions in the region.
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This also antagonized the Japanese business community by
implying the American navy would ensure American
businesses' access to ports which were equally essential
to Japanese business interests.

This loophole left the

issue of which nation's navy would control the Pacific
trade lanes open to continued debate.

These failures

provided friction in Japanese-American relations and
necessitated the London Naval Conference.
Eight years after the Washington Naval Conference,
isolationist sentiment in the United States was stronger
than ever due to the Depression and the unsettling
influence of the Japanese military's and government's
territorial and political aggression.
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' Most importantly,

Nationalist turmoil in China threatened Japanese trade
interests at a time when the Japanese business community
could ill afford to lose markets. 52

It is important to

note that approximately 25 percent of Japan's exports went
to China at the time; therefore, disruption of trade with
China devastated the Japanese economy.
Additionally,
dislocated m
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social and political lines were sharply

Japan.
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According to Modelski's model,

these dislocations characterize Japan as a rival power
during the interwar period.

The Japanese people and navy
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also felt angry about the inferior position the nation was
assigned by the Washington Naval Treaty.
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To improve its

standing at home the Japanese government agreed to
cooperate with British and the United States1 governments
and attend a new conference.
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The Japanese government

hoped a new treaty would result in better terms and
alleviate some of the pressure it was under.

It also

hoped for improved American trade relations and a freer
hand in China.
Further fueling the growing air of conflict, the
balance of naval power shifted from a situation where
there was no predominant naval power to one where the
Japanese navy was clearly in control of the Pacific.
Because of the loopholes in the Washington Naval Treaty, t
the Japanese navy expanded until had the ability to defeat
the British and American navies.

This shift precipitated

a new American naval build-up directed at the Japanese
navy.

It also sent notice to the Japanese government that

the American government would act to defend American
business interests in the region.
Furthermore, the American and Japanese governments'
perceptions of security needs were at odds once more and
the Philippines was at the heart of the debate.
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The

Philippines was a rich source of raw resources and the
archipelago formed a strategic choke point across the
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trade lanes to the Dutch territory of Java (Indonesia).
This choke point posed a critical problem for the Japanese
government as oil from Royal Dutch Shell wells in the
Javanese archipelago and via tanker from the Arabian
peninsula were the only known alternative to American
crude oil.

In the event of war or further disintegration

of Japanese-American diplomatic relations, the Japanese
government had to have access to Dutch oil or face the
collapse of Japanese industry.

Access to Philippine

waters was the only way to guarantee the oil supply.
Despite the failure of the Washington Naval Conference
to resolve previous regional frictions, the Japanese and
the United States' governments tried to avert conflict in
stage four of their relationship by attending the 1930
London Naval Conference.

This conference failed because

it tried to solve bilateral economic problems by resorting
to naval disarmament instead of addressing the economic
factor of conflicting Pacific trade interests.
Japanese delegation's goals were:

The

(1) the acknowledgment

of the Japanese government's right to the Shantung
peninsula,

(2) the legal transfer of German territories

north of the Equator to the Japanese government, and (3)
the recognition of racial equality.

These points were

part of the Japanese government's Twenty-one Demands.
These demands solidified Japanese political, economic, and

N
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military control over Northern China, Inner Mongolia, and
Manchuria and extended Japanese political and commercial
C Q

influence in China.
Aside from the Japanese delegation's goals, the
conference's goals were to:
imperialism,

(1) repudiate colonial

(2) limit all combat vessels, and (3)

establish a balance of power.
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By repudiating colonial

imperialism, the American and British governments hoped to
keep the Japanese government from any military adventures
in China.

By limiting naval vessels, those governments

also hoped to preserve their navies' respective spheres of
influence.

By establishing a balance of power, the

British and American governments hoped to maintain their
economic and naval positions in the Pacific and to prevent
the Japanese government from attempting to augment its
position in the region.

Finally, by curbing military

expenditures, all of the governments hoped to free capital
to support economies suffering from the Great Depression.
While the overall conference goals were clear-cut, the
resolution of national goals was difficult.

The Japanese

government hnd navy wanted 70-percent parity in auxiliary
vessels

(i. e. destroyers, cruisers, submarines) to secure

continued Japanese access to the Pacific trade lanes and
markets.60

The Japanese delegation discounted submarines

as their role was defensive.
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Although workable on the surface, the negotiations
faltered.

Conflicting Japanese and American economic

interests fueled this failure.

The Japanese government

had a vested interest in Philippine neutrality.

Trade in

vital food stuffs and natural resources exported by the
Philippines was necessary to support the flagging Japanese
economy.

Future Japanese economic hegemony also depended

on the dismemberment of American and British naval bases
in the Pacific.

The Japanese Navy also saw the United

States' naval building program as a direct threat aimed at
Japanese regional economic interests, especially those in
China.
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This perception was probably correct given the

continued interest in China by American business and the
subsequent need to support access to the China trade by
means of forcibly keeping open American

trade concessions

over both Japanese business and Chinese Nationalist
objections.
As for the United States' government,

its position as

a Pacific power greatly determined the American
delegation's demands.

The concentration of American trade

interests in the Philippines and recent economic ties in
China and in Korea made it imperative for the United
States' Navy to have preeminence in the Pacific.
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Adding

to the dilemma was the United States' government's policy
toward China.

Its desire to maintain the Open Door trade
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policy with the Nationalist government of China put the
United States' government in direct opposition to future
Japanese economic and territorial expansion in China.
Upon completion of the treaty, the Japanese
government faced the problems of increased militarism, a
discredited parliament, and growing expansionist sentiment
in the military and business sectors.

Underlying these

problems was the economic condition of the Japanese
people.

Because Japanese business depended' upon British

and American trade, the Japanese delegation could not
openly refuse to sign the treaty, no matter how
detrimental it seemed to Japan's national interests.

&3

The worldwide Depression accounted for major economic,
social, and political dislocations in Japan and caused the
per capita income in Japan to fall over fifty percent when
the United States' market for rice and silk collapsed.
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By signing the treaty, Japanese government
negotiators hoped for better business and economic
treatment.
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However, the perception by the Japanese

military and public that the treaty did not address
Japanese needs weakened the government's credibility.

The

Japanese press also alleged advantages were not exploited
by the Japanese delegation during the Conference.
Finally, the Japanese civilian government collapsed.
• i
•
• •
Japanese military invaded Manchuria m

1931.

6 (5

The
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Before its 1902 war with Russia and its acquisition
of German Pacific island territories during World War I,
the Japanese government saw expansion as a way to further
its economic interests and to lessen the tremendous
overcrowding occasioned by the doubling of its population
between 1890 and 1913. 67

Military and business circles

believed expansion could avert national catastrophe;
therefore, Japanese intervention in Manchuria would
strengthen Japan economically and provide an outlet for
its booming population growth.
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In short, the London Naval Conference failed because
it addressed naval versus trade interests.

One has only

to compare statistics to see just how far Japanese
industrialization and economic growth came since the
1890s:
\
TOTAL POPULATION
U. S.
JAPAN

1890
62.6
39.9

URBAN POPULATION
1890
U. S.
15.3
JAPAN
6.3

1938
138 .3
72 .2
(millions)
1938
32.8
28. 6
(millions)
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During this period, both countries' populations doubled.
Within a fifty year span, the degree of urbanization in
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Japan quintupled compared to the United States' urban
population.

INDUSTRIALIZATION
8

U. S.
JAPAN

1880
-38
10

1938
167
38
(capacity)

IRON & STEEL PRODUCTION
1880
1938
U. S .
9 .3
28.8
JAPAN
0.2
7.0
(% world market)
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Here again Japanese industry made great strides, despite
its virtual lack of natural resources.

ENERGY CONSUMPTION
U. S.
JAPAN

1890
1938
147
697
4.6
96.5
(million metric tons)

INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL
U. S.
JAPAN

1880
45.9
7.6

1938
528
88
(%. realized)

Compared to the United States' admitted industrial lead,
Japanese business came out of the Dark Ages to the
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twentieth century at an astonishing rate, much faster than
American business in the nineteenth century.

WORLD MANUFACTURING
U. S.
JAPAN

MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION

1938
•31.4
2 .0

MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION
U. S.
JAPAN

1938
143
552
(rate of production)
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The astounding productivity of Japanese business, although
accounting for a small share of world production, gave the
American business community pause.

DEFENSE SPENDING
U. S.
JAPAN

1938
1131
2489
(million $)

WAR MAKING POTENTIAL
U. S
JAPAN

1937
41.7
31.5
(relative capacity)

AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION
U. S.
JAPAN

1937
2195
44 67
(thousands/year)

73
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GNP & % SPENT ON DEFENSE
1937
68
4
($billions)

U. S.
JAPAN

1.5
28.2
(%GNP)

Japanese industrial capacity grew tremendously between
1890 and 1939.

The United States was the only other

Pacific nation which experienced such rapid population
growth and industrial production.

Japanese and American

industry produced such a volume goods that they required
greater shares of foreign markets to handle their excess
industrial capacity.

Neither countries' markets could

absorb the abundance of cheap, mass-produced goods.
Furthermore, by spending so much on its defense
sector, the Japanese government virtually bankrupted
itself.

Without access to more markets- and a continued

high growth rate, the Japanese government faced disaster.
Japanese business had no choice but to move into American
business enclaves.
warfare.

This necessitated virtual trade

Because of the emergence of Japan as an

industrial power in the Pacific and its ability to
challenge American interests in the region, the question
of discriminatory trade practices emerged as yet another
source of friction between the Japanese and the United
States' governments.
Because the continued access to Pacific markets
depended on internal security and international peace, the

44

Japanese government interfered in turbulent Chinese
domestic politics.
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By doing so, it challenged American

leadership and the American government's political and
economic policies as advocated by Secretary of State John
Hay in 1900.
Although the Japanese government originally proposed
that if "the United States would not challenge Japan's
position in Manchuria; Japan would permit American
investment in the region," this challenge to the status
quo was another sign of regional instability and of the
existing tensions.^6

A joint statement by Secretary of

State Lansing and Viscount Ishii on November 2, 1927
"affirmed the 'Open Door' principle and respect for
Chinese 'integrity,' and agreed that Japan has special
interests in China, particularly in the part to which her
possessions are contiguous."
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With its growing reliance on lucrative trade
generated by shipping raw and finished goods from the
Philippines to America, the United States' Congress passed
laws which favored Philippine imports and were detrimental
to Japanese'businesses.

The Congress increased taxes on

major Japanese exports such as "camphor, pottery, cotton
textiles,

furniture,

. . . silk textiles and toys",

virtually killing the American import trade with Japan.
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Consequently, while the Depression preoccupied the
United States' government with the problems of massive
unemployment and economic paralysis, Pacific region trade
interests became critical to American economic health.
Accompanying the United States' economic collapse, the
worldwide depression hit Japan and created great hardship.
To shore up its economic health, the Japanese government
turned to expansionist policies.
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The Depression caused massive dislocations in all
areas related to Japan's commercial interests.

The price

of Japanese goods in 1930 fell 35 percent, decreasing
business profits greatly.
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"The chief source of the

economic difficulties . . . was the fall in raw silk
prices . . . by 50 percent and silk exports . . . were
only 53 percent in value (although 82 p'ercent in weight)
of those in 1929."81

To counter the effects of the

collapse, Japanese business aggressively exported finished
goods
1929.)

(roughly 4 3 percent to the United States alone in
82

The Japanese government placed a 25 percent tax

on imported textiles, gave subsidies to the sugar,
shipping, shipbuilding, and railroad industries, and
exempted iron and steel producers from taxes.
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Additionally, the Japanese government played an active
role by aiding industry m

exporting to foreign markets.

84
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Economic rivalry and the use of trade as an instrument of
Japanese economic policy became established practices.
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With mainland concessions seemingly imperiled,
domestic Japanese economic needs were threatened by the
p.otential loss of foreign trade from areas where the
Japanese government exercised political control.
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Japan

felt it could neither maintain the right to nor the ideal
of the coprosperity sphere unless it fought the United
States for mercantile hegemony in the Pacific.
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Ultimately, the Japanese government's policies of
trade, military, and territorial expansionism led to
conflict (World War II) because of several key economic
factors.

These factors were:

against Japanese products,

(l)high American tariffs

(2)the Japanese government's

need to acquire territory in order to ease population
problems,

(3)the need to ensure a continued flow of raw

resources (i.e., oil and steel) to Japan to support its
continued industrial expansion and high growth rate, and
(4)the need to ensure access to markets for its finished
products.
By examining the nature of Japanese and American
national interests and the degree to which economic
concerns influenced these interests, one explained the
fourth phase of Modelski's long cycle.

The use of the

1922 Washington Naval Conference to highlight the impact
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of economic interests upon policy choices further
underscored the economic nature of Pacific conflict.

The

economic impact of the Depression and the importance of
Pacific markets to the Japanese and American governments
highlighted the military and economic tensions in this
stage of deconcentration.

The key to this chapter is

territorial expansion, trade practices, and national
economic interests contributed to the Japanese economic
challenge.

The Washington and London Naval Conferences

indicated the depth the economic environment affected
policy positions and outcomes.

The economic origins of

conflict in stage four of the last bilateral long cycle
contributed to World War II.

Because one now knows the

factors which caused deconcentration in the preceding
fourth long cycle, one can now examine the current fourth
cycle to see if similar factors exist.
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CHAPTER 3

This chapter examines the impact of economic changes
on the post World War II Japanese-American relationship.
Specifically,

it covers the economic origins of stability

and delegitimation.

The current stage of the relationship

is also compared to the interwar period to see if
parallels exist.
considerations,

Because of these economic
it is possible the Japanese government may

challenge and try to replace the United States' government
as the leader in the Pacific in the current stage of
deconcentration.

The economic indicators used to support

this premise are GNP, GDP, volume of trade, export levels,
productivity, balance of trade, and investment.
While the United States-Japan relationship was tense
in the interwar period,

it ended in war during the first

stage of the current long cycle.

After World War II,

stage two of the current long cycle saw the United States'
government emerge as the unquestioned economic, military,
and political leader.

The Japanese government, although

defeated during stage one of the current bilateral cycle,
became the United States' government's staunchest ally in
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the Pacific during stage two. This alliance mirrors the
American government's pre-World War II relationship with
the British government.
During the second stage of the American cycle,
Japanese businessmen and the Japanese government again
adopted American economic policies and practices.

They

adapted them to meet Japanese manufacturing sector needs.
The Japanese government also retained its turn of the
century and interwar period practice of extensive
governmental involvement in trade and manufacturing.

This

involvement included export, shipping, and industrial
subsidies plus extensive intervention in "heavy industry,
iron, steel and shipbuilding".
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Japan became one of them

most advanced countries in the world due to its industrial
infrastructure and literate, nationalistic, cohesive
populace.
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It also had the added impetus of available

capital and protection of its trade lanes courtesy of the
United States' Navy.
During this second stage, Japanese industry
experienced fantastic growth fueled by the rapid influx of
American capital.

This is important because,

in long

cycle theory, the leader must co-opt other powers by
economic incentives as well as military power.

During

this stage of hegemonic leadership, American industry and
the American government had the resources necessary to

co-opt the Japanese government and industry.

One has only

to look at the following figures to see just how quickly
Japanese industry recovered from the devastation of
American bombing in World War II:

GROSS SHARE OF WORLD PRODUCTION
U. S.
21.5% (1980)
JAPAN
4.5% (1960)

25.9% (1960)
9.0%

(1980)

1950 GNP
PER CAPITA
U. S.
$381
JAPAN

$3 82

PER CAPITA
U. S.
$2,590
JAPAN
$9,890

TOTAL
$2,536
$32
(billion)
1980 GNP
TOTAL
$11,360
$1,157
(billion)

These figures are important as they underscore the United
States' relative industrial decline and Japanese
industry's climb.

While American industry's share of

world production declined between 1960 and 1980, Japanese
industry's doubled.

Where Japanese GNP was only 10% of

American GNP in 1950, it was almost 50% of American GNP in
1980.

This reflects the exceptional strides Japanese

industry made during phases two and three of the current
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cycle and the degree to which the American government's
position switched from unrivaled to seriously challenged.
Part of the reason for this challenge is the impact
American capital investment had on Japanese business.
Between the 1950s and mid-1970s, orders for goods
made in Japan to supply American troops in Korea, Vietnam,
and Japan poured in.

Toyota is one example of the effect

this spending had on Japan.

Toyota "was in danger of

foundering when it was rescued by the first of the U. S.
Defense Department's orders for its trucks".
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Now,

Toyota is one of the largest, most modern, most
competitive automobile manufacturers in the world.
Additionally, Japanese exports in 1951 almost tripled
over their 194 9 level and production increased 70
percent.
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The dollars generated by U.' S. Army purchases

soared from $590 million in 1951 to over $800 million in
both 1952 and 1953 enabling Japan to purchase "$2 billion
in imports [to]

. . . key industries [to]

double their scale of production."
War . . .
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. . .virtually

"From the Vietnam

increases iri America's dollar outflows

94
accelerated."
During this second stage of bilateral stability,
Japanese trade with the United States flourished.
American military protection and capital ensured peace and
security needs.

Gradually, Japanese business shifted from
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supplying cheap consumer goods like textiles to supplying
inexpensive electronics.

Japanese industry upgraded

products to meet American market needs and invested in
technology and long-term growth.

The demands of the

Korean War and the reinstatement of the zaibatsu
occasioned much of this growth m

industrial goods.
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With a centralized production system provided by
zaibatsu. the ability to produce trucks and equipment for
the U. S. Army accelerated.

Additionally, the revenues

generated by U. S. Army purchases encouraged further
investment m

plant, equipment, and technology.
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While

the electronics and nuclear technology fields developed
during World War II; Japanese business integrated imported
technologies into those industries as well as into the
engineering,
industries.
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industrial machinery, and shipbuilding
The combination of imported technologies

created low-cost mass production systems.

This furthered

Japanese industry's transfer to advanced product
marketing.
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Thus, Japanese industry flourished under

American military protection, with American investment,
and because1of the American government's attempts to
maintain stability in the Pacific.
Although the United States was the region's economic,
political, and military leader from the end of World War
II to the mid 1960s, the late 1960s saw the era of
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American political and military hegemony end.

A third

stage in the cycle occurred, that of delegitimation.
United Nations,

The

long an American forum, became the voice

of the Third World.

The United States1 government faced

political challenge from the Soviet Union in Vietnam and
economically by the 1973 Arab oil embargo.

What was good

for the United States' government was no longer accepted
by the majority of the region's nations.

Even the

Japanese government, the American government's major
Pacific ally, changed.
While the nature of the change was not violent or
sudden,

it challenged American business views of the

Pacific market.

During this period Japanese business

rapidly expanded trade by producing for both the regional
and the American markets.
growth rate m

It averaged an unmatched 10.5%

its domestic product. 99

The Japanese

business community discarded free market trade propounded
by the United States business community and government as
invalid and insufficient to meet its needs.

The Japanese

practices of protected trade, economic planning, and
continuous reinvestment in plants, equipment, and
technology worked for Japanese industry.
In short, American business practices and the role of
American capital faced a challenge from Japanese business
and capital because the American business community was
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unable to provide economic and military security.

The

Vietnam War was too large a drain on available resources
and the Japanese government and business community had to
step in to fill the gap.

Trade protectionism sheltered

fledgling electronics and automotive industries, enabling
them to grow, improve, and sell free of competition.
Another sign of the onset of delegitimation was the
creation of the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) as an agency for channeling capital,
facilitating trade, and promoting the needs of Japanese
industry.

MITI encouraged and coordinated industrial and

technological change and advancement.

MITI became

necessary to Japanese industry's economic well-being.
With the advent of the MITI in the 1950s, the
Japanese government began to operate independently of the
American government's trade policies.
became a Pacific trade contender.

Japanese industry

Japanese industry's

challenge to the American government's position as the
Pacific's economic leader is most pronounced in the areas
of high technology goods market share.

Within a decade, Japan's shipyards were producing
over half of the world's tonnage of launchings.
By
the 1970s, its . . . steelworks were turning out as
much as the American steel industry.
[And] between
1960 and 1984 its share of world car production rose
from 1 percent to 2 3 percent . . . the country moved
. . . to high technology products — to computers,
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telecommunications, aerospace, robotics, and
biotechnology . . . By the late 1970s the Japanese
GNP was . . . more than half the size of America's.
Within one generation, its share of world
manufacturing output, and of GNP, had risen from
around 2-3 percent to around 10 percent.
n_

At the same time, the United States' industrial lead
steadily slipped.
The purpose, of this chapter was to demonstrate the
origins of stability and delegitimation.

By concentrating

on these stages, the shift from military to economic
leadership as the critical measure of stability is
apparent.

This economic element is the main factor in

rising instability in the current long cycle.

\
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CHAPTER FOUR

In the early 1980s, the United States' government
entered upon the final stage of this long cycle,
deconcentration.

No longer is the United States'

government and business community the unquestioned
political and economic leader.

There is no longer a

communist threat around which to rally the American
government's client states or to serve as the focus of its
foreign policy.

The Japanese government now acts

independently of the United States' government and
challenges it for a greater leadership role in the
Pacific.
Underscoring this potential challenge to the leader,
one has only to look at the importance of Pacific trade to
see which way the balance leans.

Non-American Pacific GDP

increased from 7.8 percent in 1960 to 16.4 percent in
1982.
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.

.

.

IN 1960, American trade with the Pacific equated

to only 48 percent of its trade with Europe.
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By 1983,

American trade with the Pacific escalated to approximately
122 percent of its business with Europe.
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By 1987, the
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region accounted for 4 3 percent of the entire w o r l d ’s
GNP.105
While stage two of the current long cycle indicated
the United S t ates' government was the senior partner in
the relationship, the contemporary period indicates a
change in the relationship.

In the current situation, the

Japanese government may become the senior partner by
virtue of its favorable balance of trade and its control
of investment capital available to finance the United
States' government's enormous debt.
With the changes currently underway in this period of
deconcentration, one must start with the assumption that
Japan may become the predominant partner in
Japanese-American trade relations.

For proof of this

premise, one has only to look at current trade surpluses
in Japan and with the Four Tigers.

The United States'

government is dealing with them from a position of debtor.
The unwillingness of Japanese businesses and the Japanese
government to accede to the trade demands of President
Bush and the Big Three auto makers (Chrysler, General
Motors and Ford) during their February 1992 visit to Japan
underscores this tenet.
Finally, this assumption highlights the fact that the
issues of trade and economics in Japan and the United
States are ever more important to policy makers.

Because
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economic considerations drive the ability of a state to
become a leader,
issues.

it is imperative one examine these

Among these concerns are:

situation evolve?

(1) How did this

(2) Will it remain the same?

(3) Can

the United States regain its past position of preeminence?
(4) To what extent does American economic malaise affect
Japan?

The answers to these questions point to the

interdependence which exists and to a probable gradual
decline in Japan's trade advantage as the American economy
continues to deteriorate.

This is important because,

if

the Japanese government is to replace the United States1
government as the leader,

it must either wean itself from

the American market, or work to reinvigorate the American
economy.

The relationship and its potential course are

relevant from a contemporary policy standpoint as future
American and Japanese foreign policy may be based on
similar questions.

Additionally, because trade and

economic conditions occasioned the last Japanese-American
conflict in the Pacific, one must determine the extent of
current economic frictions.
One must outline how competition, trade practices,
trade surpluses, and the Japanese government's outlook on
trade with the United States may impact the next cycle.
First, competition is the means of ensuring Japan's
economic survival.

The key aspect of competition is the
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pursuit of what is good for Japanese business and,
ultimately, the Japanese nation.

For example, American

car manufacturers accused Japanese car manufacturers of
dumping cars on the American market to unfairly gain
market share.
Despite the success of this practice, Japanese car
manufacturers curbed exports to the European market.

They

did this to secure a potentially larger quota share in the
unified European market.106

Although this move helped the

Europeans during the 1991 recession, the intent was to
gain and maintain market access necessary for continued
Japanese expansion and economic well-being.

It was a well

thought-out market strategy.
While the American business community deems Japanese
business practices invalid, the Japanese approach to
competition effectively ensured Japanese business'
viability.

Closely linked to the issue of competition is

that of Japanese trade practices.

Formal and informal

barriers are among the most persistent means of
controlling access to domestic and foreign markets.

A

close examination of keiretsu, a modern day version of
zaibatsu. give a good idea of how these barriers work.
Keiretsu are "large, financially linked groups of
companies"
economy.107

which form the backbone of the Japanese
These firms buy from their subsidiaries and
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from each other before turning to outside agencies for
material or equipment.

This practice precludes external

trade and inhibits access to the Japanese market.

The

resulting profits remain in country and further encourage
huge trade surpluses.

These practices mirror the role of

Japanese industry and government during the last period of
deconcentration.
During the interwar period, the Japanese government
and business community engaged in similar practices in
China and Manchuria.

Zaibatsu, the predecessor of

keiretsu. performed the same function in the interwar
period.

Zaibatsu were "certain great Japanese business

houses with extremely widespread interests.

The four

major [ones] were Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda.
These concerns played a vital part in the economic rise of
Japan.

. . [and] their importance was not limited to the

economic sphere,
politics.

for they made their influence felt in

. . [as they] became agents for the execution of

the Government's economic policy" and economic power was
concentrated in them.
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In stage one of the current

cycle, these practices led to increased economic,
political and military tensions between the Japanese and
American governments.

While attempts to allay these

tensions took the form of the Washington and London Naval
Conferences, they were directly tied to trade frictions.
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While the Japanese and American governments engaged
in a trade war of tariffs, barriers, rhetoric, currency
manipulation, and conflicting economic needs in the
previous fourth stage, this led to open warfare.

The

c.urrent fourth stage exhibits some of the same economic
frictions.

Today, Japanese markets which appear tightly

closed against American goods while American markets are
full of Japanese products.

In stage four, Japanese

business expanded trade aggressively into South Korea,
Thailand, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
These were traditional American markets in stage two.
Today the Japanese government bars American agricultural
products by stiff tariffs.

This is because of political

agitation by Japanese rice and beef lobbies.

In the

interwar period, the American government barred Japanese
rice and silk exports with prohibitive tariffs.
While the United States' Navy has naval supremacy and
control of Pacific trade lanes, Japanese business has the
economic power to forestall American moves.

In stage four

of the last bilateral cycle, the Japanese Navy had
regional control and the United States' government had
economic control.

American economic power steadily

declined relative to Japan's rapid economic advancement in
stage three.

The Japanese government's ability to conduct

yen diplomacy parallels the United States' government's

62

pre-World War II ability to conduct dollar diplomacy.
Contrary to the American government's interwar period
interest in promoting disarmament, the United States'
government now wants the Japanese government to assume
some of the Pacific's defense burden.
If the United States' government pursues a policy of
self-interest and self-preservation to counter the
possible Japanese challenge, a trade war may occur.

The

pursuit of bilateral leadership in this period of
deconcentration and challenge could lead the Japanese
government to act out of its own trade interests.

Such

action could prevent the United States1 government from
achieving its own security (i.e., economic) needs.
this occurs,
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If

a Japanese government that can say no could

destabilize the region.

It could undermine American

Pacific leadership to the extent that a new leader would
replace the faltering American leadership in a new cycle
of conflict, stability, delegitimation, and
deconcentration.
Contributing regional instability and
deconcentration, Japanese trade practices weaken the
American government's economic and political influence by
eating away at American trade.

Keiretsu discourage

imports and hurt other exporting nations because of
unequal access.

Within the context of Modelski's long

'
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cycles,

one can argue that an examination of trade

interests and their military and economic ramifications,
may enable one to forecast the path an emerging conflict
may take.
For an example of just how successfully Japanese
trade dominates markets, one has only to look at trade
figures.

Japan's trade surpluses grew 35.3 percent in May

1991 to US$4.18 billion, the United States absorbed
massive deficits of US$1.95 billion.110

The more durable

goods an industrialized nation exports, the better off it
is.

Conversely, the more durable goods an industrialized

nation imports, the less well off it is.
drains on domestic capital.
than it exports,

Imports are

When a nation imports more

"tension and a dangerous situation

[arise]" for the exporting country.111 * Within Modelski's
framework, one sees these tensions as the basis of
conflict during the period of deconcentration immediately
preceding a new long cycle.
Despite the current tendency of Japanese industry to
build factories outside of Japan to off-set production
costs, trade surpluses-still exist.

Keiretsu enable

companies to manufacture goods cheaply,

sell them at

competitive prices, and still not have to purchase
components from non-Japanese companies.

Keiretsu deepens

trade imbalances by expanding Japan's trade surplus.

They
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also add to the air of instability.
Aside from these considerations, the Japanese
people's view of the United States' government and
citizenry must be taken into account.
This view is an indicator of power or perceived power
shifts.

In the past, the Japanese government saw the

United States' business community as a role model in
manufacturing, technology, and trade practices.

The

United States' government was a friend and a potential
rival in the Pacific (previous stage four).

Japanese

industry impressed the United States citizenry by its
transformation of Japan from a backward,

feudal,

insular

nation to a modern military and economic power capable of
threatening American interests in the Pacific (previous
stage four).

These perceptions reflected the nature of

the power relationship in the interwar period.
Then as now, the United States was Japanese
industry's primary trade partner and extremely important
to its continued economic growth and well-being.

Today,

as Japanese industry's target market and primary trade
partner, the United States' market plays an equally
critical role in the Japanese economy.

As the Japanese

government sees things, the United States' government has
to "resolve fundamental economic . . problems and to pay
its debts" if it wants to be competitive.
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The existing
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American national deficit is a function of the United
States' government's status as the world's largest debtor
nation and its "propensity to spend beyond its means"
versus Japanese business competition.
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This attitude

indicates there is a fundamental change underway in the
relationship.
According to Japanese government and business
leaders,

if American businesses want to be competitive,

they have to invest in more plants and equipment.

The

American government must undertake rigorous educational
reform and get the political system to work more
effectively.

The root of the United States' government's

economic problem is the basic need for the United States'
government to act responsibly at home.
is not Japanese business'

The trade surplus

fault, but that of a soft,

decadent American government and industries which lack the
moral fiber to enact tough reforms.
Today, Japan sees itself as a nation of sharp
businessmen who pursued advantages, while American
business failed to accept the challenge of market
development'due to sloth, complacency, and a dulled sense
of competition.
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Japanese businessmen blame the trade

deficit on the American cost structure,

low savings rate,

lack of long-term investment, declining industrial
production, and Congressional unwillingness to reduce the

s
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budget deficit.
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These stereotypes highlight the

growing perception among the Japanese people that the
United States is in decline and that Japan is resurgent
and assuming superiority in the relationship.
Whether these generalizations are valid or not, they
fail to address the reality of market interdependence and
the possible affect this may have on determining the
future leader.

Because of the extensive interdependence

of the Japanese and American markets, the Japanese economy
is vulnerable to the continued weakness of the American
economy.

Just as the American stock market crash and

subsequent Depression in the interwar period devastated
the Japanese economy, a collapse of the American economy
would affect it again.

For example, in 1983 alone

American direct investment in Japan amounted to US$8,059
1 <1 ^

billion and US$20.67 billion in the Pacific as a whole.
Of that amount,

fully US$4,071 billion was invested in

Japanese industry and US$2,011 was invested in
petroleum.
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Additionally,

1983 Japanese investment in

the United States accounted for US$8,878 billion in
industry, US$4,856 billion in services, and US$2,056
billion in manufacturing.
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If the American economy

collapsed, even as early as 1983, the effects would spread
to the most important sectors of the Japanese and American
economies.

s
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For a complete view of the United States' decline as
regional leader, one has to consider the American popular
view of Japan.

The rationale is simple:

it reflects the

uneasiness in American public opinion about the role of
Japan and the ability of the United States' government to
remain the dominant partner in the relationship.

The

Japanese government's unwillingness to grant trade
concessions fuels the popular American perception of Japan
as a spoiler out to destroy American trade interests.
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The need for trade concessions reflects the belief that
the United States is losing control.

The closed nature of

Japanese markets heightens what American businesses see as
an arcane distribution system which precludes efficient
distribution of goods.
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Fear of potential Japanese

control of American domestic capital investment fuels
American attitudes.

121

At the heart of American criticism

of Japan is the trade deficit and the fear of Japanese
domination in world markets.
For example, a Department of Defense report hailed
the Japanese as " 'amoral, manipulative and controlling'
. . . [people]

. . . motivated by economic concerns" and

looked with fear on possible Japanese world economic
domination.

12 2

This report reflected a basic concern over

possible Japanese acquisition and denial of critical
advanced technologies,

and their denial to the United

N
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States.

Politicians view proposed acquisitions of

American high technology firms by the Japanese as a threat
to American national interests.

12 3

Politicians even blame

the Japanese government for the capital shortage along
w.ith the inability to wage war without Japanese financial
124

backing.

Conflicting" national trade interests in the high
technology arena are a major source of clashes as the
United States struggles to maintain domestic and foreign
market shares.

For example, the recent semi-conductor

pact between the United States' and Japanese governments
agrees in principle that American businesses receive
access to twenty percent of the Japanese market.

It does

not guarantee achievement of this quota— despite the
American government's agreement to dissolve its
anti-dumping price and-cost monitor system.

12 5

In addition to these conflicting interests, another
problem contributing to the current tensions is the
continued import imbalance.

While the American monthly

trade deficit "was only US$4.05 billion [for] March 1991
. . . and just 0.9 percent of the G NP", the April 1991
figures reflected a 5.9 percent growth in imports to raise
the deficit another US$4.78 billion.

12 6

Exports increased

up 4.5 percent for a total of US$35.56 billion for the
same periods.
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This deficit means the United States'
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government must borrow more capital, something
increasingly difficult to do.
times for businesses.

Less capital means tougher

This is because businesses must

compete with the federal government for funds.

One

example of this problem is the jump in government
borrowing from US$247 billion in fiscal 1990 to US$328
billion at the end of the fiscal year, and a decline in
private loans from US$541 billion to US$232,128

What this

means is slow private sector growth and lower
productivity.
While not a major problem, the impact of the Japanese
stock market on the American economy is also a factor in
current economic tensions.

With the impact of the June

1991 Recruit Corporation stock scandal in Japan on stock
share prices, a minor run on the American stock market
occurred sending prices plummeting.
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Jitters m

the

American market indicate its close ties to the Japanese
market.

For example, Japanese direct investment in the

United States totaled US$16,124 billion in 1983.130

If

Japanese banks withdrew investments in the United States
to shore up'Japanese industry,
American manufacturing,

it could be disastrous for

industry, and services sectors.

Through the use of Modelski's phases of hegemony ,
delegitimation, and decline, one possible explanation of
the Japanese-American relationship in the post World War
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II to the early 1980's .

One key point was that the

United States' government is no longer an unchallenged
hegemonic power in the Pacific.

One possibility was that

the Japanese government may assume predominance in the
relationship.

Another possibility was that the United

States' government may regain its supremacy.

The extent

to which economic positions shaped Japanese and American
popular opinion augmented the perception of change in the
relationship.

N
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CONCLUSION

In this chapter, one finds a summary of the preceding
chapters and of their main points.

The main argument made

is that the United States' position as leader is ending
and that a new long cycle is shaping up.

It is possible

Pacific trade may shape the next conflict and determine
which nation will assume leadership

Some corrective

actions are offered with the hope they will be used to
start another American long cycle.

It is also possible

that changes in this final stage of deconcentration may
bring about a new regional system indep'endent of long
cycle theory.
Briefly, this thesis concerned change,

friction, and

instability in United States-Japan bilateral relations.
The apparent decline of and challenge to the American
government's regional leadership by the Japanese
government led to the use of long cycle analysis to
explain this phenomena.

Chapter One presented a review of

relevant international relations and foreign policy
literature.

An explanation of George Modelski's long

cycle theory included the rationale for the choice and a
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summary of the theory.

The premise of the chapter was

that parallels in the United States-Japan relationship to
global long cycle relationships allow one to use a
modified version of long cycle analysis to explore the
relationship.
In Chapter Two, one examined of the fourth stage of
the first bilateral long cycle.

A review of the

Washington and London Naval Conferences emphasized the
effect of economic forces on policy choices and the United
States-Japan governmental relationship.

Chapter Three

covered the second and third stages of the current long
cycle.

The key points in Chapter Three were:

(1). the

United States' government was the hegemonic leader of the
Pacific after World War II until the late 1960s,

(2) the

stability provided by American military' and economic
assistance allowed Japanese business to flourish and met
security needs,

(3) in the late 1960s to early 1980s the

American government's concept of regional security began
to fall short of regional needs and the Japanese
government and business community began to act
independently,

(4) the growing inability of the United

States' government to supply capital required to support
Japanese and regional growth and development forced the
Japanese government and business community to fill
leadership gaps in the Pacific,

(5) the nature of
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leadership in the region no longer rests on naval and
economic power, but on trade,
technology,

investment, capital, and

(6) the Japanese government challenged the

United States' government for the role of regional leader
and may assume predominance in the relationship because of
its economic power,

and (7) economic elements which

destabilized the United States-Japan relationship in stage
four of the previous bilateral long cycle are very similar
to those which exist in the current fourth stage.
While the Japanese government may replace the United
States' government as the regional leader, there is the
possibility that a new American cycle may occur if
American industry and government alter their practices.
Modelski's model allows this possibility.

The resurgence

of Great Britain in the nineteenth century age of
industrialization is an example of resurgence.

As part of

a possible shift in economic matters, United States'
industry is changing.
For example,

Illinois Tool Works (ITW), a precision

engineering firm, shifted to a "clearly defined corporate
strategy [of]

. . . innovation and decentralized factories

that customize products on demand" m

1989.

131

This

enabled it to go from an uncompetitive stance to a "record
profit of US$182 million last year" in just one year's
time.

132

On a larger scale, Motorola learned to compete

\
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in Japan.

"By plowing massive funds into research and

development and capital investments" to the tune of over
20 percent of its 1991 revenues, Motorola improved its
product.

13 3

worked well.

Motorola's efforts at product improvement
Motorola's microchips are now in everything

from "Canon cameras to Sony camcorders.
coder is]

. . [and its voice

. . . the standard for Japan's . . . digital

telephone service." 134

While ITW and Motorola

implemented changes, they are not representative of a
possible American success at redress of the United States'
declining status in Pacific trade and power relations.
Despite American business turning to Japanese business for
management, marketing, and production techniques, the
situation is uncertain.

13 5

Because their markets are mutually’ dependent,
continued weakness in the American economy may affect the
Japanese economy and Pacific economic stability.

Because

of their interdependence, the Japanese and American
governments must cooperate on trade to ensure regional
stability.

The United States must reform its banking

system, business practices, and trade policies to remain
competitive and to maintain its standard of living.
does no,

it may become like Great Britain.

If it

Because of

repeated currency devaluations between 1960 and 1988,
Great Britain fell from the richest to the poorest major
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nation in Europe, despite lowering its deficit to 0.3
percent of its GNP.136
If the American and Japanese economies are
interdependent and if the American economy drags down the
Japanese economy, the effect could spill over and upset
Pacific trade and stability.

If one looks deeper than

Japan's soaring 11.2 percent economic growth rate, there
are some soft spots.
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Japanese businesses do not

produce goods in large quantities, but work out of
existing inventories.

One reason for this is a decreased

amount of exports to the United States due to American
economic problems.

Japanese investment also shifted.

Over the past decade, Japanese industry invested
plant and capital in Southeast Asia as well as China.
Thailand,

In

for example, Japanese busines's investment

amounted to US$1.52 billion for 1985 to 1988, surpassing
its investment in the United States!
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In 1989, Japanese

business invested US$270 billion in Asia versus US$206
billion m

North America.

13 9

The weakness of the American

dollar and the sluggish American economy forced Japanese
industry t o ‘develop and expand markets in the Pacific.
Aside from these effects , less obvious ones are
present.

The most alarming effect is the resurgence of

anti-American sentiment among the Japanese right-wing.
This harkens back to the militarism of the interwar
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period.

If Shintaro Ishihara's The Japan That Can Sav No

is truly representative, then Japan may become a political
and strategic risk to American security interests in the
Pacific just as it was in the interwar period.

Ishihara

argues for an independent Japanese economic and foreign
policy.

The Japanese government is urged to stand up to

the United States' government and to act in its own best
interests, regardless of what the American government
wants it to do.

Ishihara also touts Japan as the new

world economic leader with a right to demand the Americans
take notice of its wishes.

This overtly militant stance

is yet one more indication of the change occurring in the
Japanese-American relationship and of the belief in Japan
that the United States is a declining power.

It also

indicates that popular opinion in Japan' paints Japan as
the United States' successor in the Pacific.

14 0

Whether the Japanese government becomes the new
leader or the United States' government regains its
hegemonic position, Pacific rim trade may determine the
outcome.

Based on changes in the Japanese-American

relationship,

it is possible trade replaced naval power

the key agent

of leadership in the fourth stage of the

current cycle.

as

If this is true, whoever holds sway over

Pacific trade

may be the next leader.

In the current

cycle's stage

of deconcentration, Pacific trade may become
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the source of challenge necessary to end American
leadership and to precipitate the next leadership
conflict.

An examination of trade and investment patterns

points to the importance of the Pacific trade as the new
measure for determining regional leadership.
In 1987, Japan exported US$154.1 trillion of finished
goods to the Pacific region and imported just over half
that figure from its Pacific neighbors.141

By 1989,

almost thirty percent of all Japanese exports went to
Pacific nations.

142

For example,

iron and steel went to

Korea, tape recorders and ships to Singapore, power plants
to Thailand and Taiwan and metal processing machinery to
Thailand and Korea.

14 3

Coinciding with increased level of exports to Pacific
nations, the Japanese government exported capital through
direct investment.

In the Pacific as a whole, the

Japanese government increased its 1988 investment by 14.4
percent over what it spent in 1987 for a total value of
US$5,569 billion.144

By far the greatest share of

investment capital went to Thailand.

Japanese business

investment in Thailand soared 243.6 percent over its 1937
level, while Hong Kong and Singapore saw 55 and 51.2
percent increases for the same period respectively.

14 5

This kind of investment indicates an immense interest in
the Pacific market and points to the possibility of the
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Japanese government and industry staking a claim to
leadership.
As a result of this tremendous influx of capital into
the Pacific, Japanese industrial development became
ubiquitous.

This capital boom helped lift standards of

living, create jobs, and turn nations such as Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia into
export-oriented manufacturing nations.

14 6

The economic

growth generated in the region in 1990 by Yen-diplomacy
surpassed that of North America for the first time in
history.

147

Along with the spread of industrial growth, Japanese
economic might also increased in the region.

For example,

Japanese direct investment accounted for US$35.95 billion
invested in the Pacific in 1983 versus US$20.67 billion by
the United States.

14 8

These two are closely linked as a

vibrant manufacturing sector denotes an expanding economy
and further strengthen^ it.

Where American industry

dominated Pacific development in stage two, it is the role
of Japanese finance agencies in stage four.

Japanese

busine'ss is the new leading economic power in the Pacific
and may tilt the balance of power sharply toward the
Japanese government.
For the past fourteen years, the Japanese government
consistently spent more than the United States' government
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and business community in terms of total investment and
shows no signs of weakening its commitment to the
region.

149

In the last two years alone, the Japanese

government spent US$17.6 billion in the Pacific compared
w-ith the United States' government's paltry US$4.6
billion.
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With no real military threat and the limited

withdrawal of American forces from the region, the United
States' government's economic weakness is most apparent.
In 1990, the United States' standard of living fell.
The top six industrialized nations closed the gap
separating them from what was once the world's highest
standard of living.
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The American economy grew slowly

since 1972, while the Japanese standard of living grew 80
percent during the same period.

152

Measured m

terms of

gross domestic product (GDP), the average American GDP
fell to US$14,070 per capita from US$14,080 in 1989 and
capital investment formed only 12.6% of American GDP
versus 23.4% of Japanese GDP.

153

.
While the cost of living

is higher in Japan, the Japanese standard of living
improved in 1989, while the United States' standard of
living fell.
Because the levels for GDP and the creation of new
businesses are both low, exports are a potential source of
continued growth.

This situation is reminiscent of both

the Japanese government's and the United States'

s
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government's positions in the 1930s.
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For this formula

to work, orders for durable goods must increase.

However,

orders for durable goods dropped 1.6 percent in June 1991
to US$116.52 billion as orders to defense contractors fell
I RC

US$1.5 billion.

Unlike the 1960s to 1970s where

exports increased eight percent a year, export growth fell
to only five percent a year after 1980.
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In short, the

United States' government's gross national product (GNP)
is stagnant.
Since the GDP is based in part on export sales, any
decrease in exports adversely affects it.
falls, poverty rates go up.

When the GDP

Corresponding to the 0.5

percent decline in the GDP, the number of poor in America
increased roughly six percent to just over two million
people m

1991.
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Additionally, the jobless rate rose

from 433,000 to 439,000 for the same period.
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One must

bear in mind the basis for statistics are unemployment
applications.

There is no allowance for those people who

either did not file for unemployment or who are working
part-time or on temporary jobs until a full-time job
becomes available.

Therefore, the actual numbers may be

greater than reported.
While American exports affect the United States'
economy directly,
on it too.

foreign exports have an indirect impact

By supplying investment capital in the
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Pacific,

the Japanese government virtually ensured a cycle

of increased Pacific exports to America.

These exports

are necessary to fuel the import of industrial supplies
and equipment from the Japanese government to its client
states.
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In essence, the Japanese government's efforts

to expand trade in the Pacific and to diversify clientele
resulted in a virtual closing of Pacific markets to
American products by tying regional growth and well-being
to the availability of Japanese capital and investment.
Although exports are critically important to the
economic well-being of'a country, competitiveness is just
as crucial.

To define competitiveness, the "1990 World

Competitiveness Report" focused on factors which make a
country attractive to investors and which highlight the
aggressiveness exhibited by its corporations
world-wide.160

The factors highlighted in the report are

"domestic economic strength,
internationalization,
government,

[the stability and the kind of]

[available]

infrastructure,

[the degree of]

finances,

[the level of]

[the type of] management [techniques

utilized], [the ability to exploit] science and
technology, and [the nature and caliber of its]
people".161

These determinants are then applied to

industrialized and newly industrialized economies.
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When applied to the Japanese government, the report
found it to be the best in all but two areas.

The large

degree of industrialization, superior business management,
a strong economy and first-rate use of science and
technology indicate the Japanese government's predominance
in Pacific competition.162

While the United States'

government is the best for infrastructure (natural
resources, transportation, communications)

and second to

the Japanese government in the quality of its labor force
and use of science and technology,

it lacks business

confidence and is held back by its enormous budget and
trade deficits.163

Based on this report, the United

States' government has a precarious position as second
best to the Japanese government.
Underscoring this alarming proposition,

is Japan's

US$32 billion surplus and the United States' government's
US$110 billion deficit.164

The United States' government

is the world's largest debtor (US$660 billion).

It no

longer leads in production of goods and services or
standard of living, and it has a virtually imperceptible
one percent yearly growth rate.
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Japan has a higher

growth rate than the United States.

Japan also has the

world's highest standard of living.

Japan is the world's

industrial and financial leader, the position the United
States' government assumed from Great Britain in 1930.
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Another key factor ensuring continued Japanese growth and
economic strength is the investment in and utilization of
research and development.166
While the United States' government is in trouble
economically and its market share and influence in the
Pacific face erosion,

it is possible it can begin a second

period of Pacific leadership.

This is compatible with

long cycle theory as a power can reemerge after
experiencing a stage of challenge and decline.

In the

American case, this depends on its ability to preclude
further market losses in the Pacific.

For this to occur,

the United States' government must define and focus its
business and economic interests and adapt its products to
meet local market needs.

American businesses must be

competitive with Japanese businesses within the Pacific
market.
To define and focus its economic interests, the
United States' government must look to the long term.

The

United States' government invests less than one percent of
its GNP per year in infrastructure compared to the five
*

percent rate of the Japanese government.
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Investment in

infrastructure creates roughly 41,000 new jobs for every
US$1 billion spent on development and maintenance of
infrastructure.
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In short, the American government must

84

invest at home and abroad.

It must correct the research

and development dilemma.
Where the Japanese government and industry fund
large-scale basic research and further industrial
exploitation and marketing of research findings, United
States' government and business do not.

American firms

must follow the lead of the Pall Corporation and IBM.

By

capitalizing on superior technology gained through
aggressive research, engineering, and specialization,

Pall

outsells Asahi and Tenimo corporations' blood filter
products.
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IBM did the same thing:

created

technologically superior personal computers and made
in-roads m

the Japanese computer market.
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For a third American cycle to occur, American
business must adapt just as Japanese bu’siness did in
stages two through four of the current long cycle.

The

Japanese auto industry came a long way by using
adaptability to its advantage.

For example, Honda turned

to the American love and vision of the automobile to
create a solid, marketable product.
manufacturers must do the same thing.
automobiles,

American
Right-hand drive

smaller bodies for narrow Pacific roads,

metric-convertible parts, etc. must be adopted.

The

product must fit the environment, not the other way
around.

85

Aside from adapting to meet market needs, American
companies must compete with Japanese industries at home
and in the Pacific.

Currently, the United States fills as

almost colonial position of "exporting raw materials and
importing manufactured goods" to and from Japan and the
Pacific respectively.
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If the United States is to

retain economic leadership,
unfinished goods.

it must export more than

Looking back at American history, both

Alexander Hamilton and nineteenth century American
industrialists understood the importance of developing an
industrial base if the country was to remain strong and
independent.

By switching from an agricultural to an

industrial society, the United States' government became a
rich, powerful,

Pacific player in the late nineteenth and

the twentieth centuries.

If one applies this test to the

newly industrialized nations of the Pacific, the same
holds true with their relation to the Japanese government.
The switch from agriculture to industry transformed these
countries to prosperous, vibrant ones capable of taking on
not only the United States but Japan as well.
Additionally, the United States' government and
industry must invest in new plants, equipment, technology,
and research.

The key to this renaissance is the

aggressive pursuit of quality, superior design,
reliability, affordability, and sound marketing.

This
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must be followed by investment of American capital in both
the Pacific and in the United States.

This follows

Modelski's tenet that the nation which controls capital is
the economic leader and it can control the actions of
other states.
If trade friction or trade warfare is the conflict
necessary to bring about the next long cycle, then Japan
and the United States should continue to be fiercely
competitive over trade in the current long cycle.

If long

cycle analysis continues to be applicable in the next
century, then it is possible a trade conflict could occur
in the form of regional trade warfare.

If this conflict

does occur, Japan may emerge as the next leader.

If this

is the case, the Japanese government may achieve regional
control through its telecommunications technology
(satellite and space surveillance)
empire.

and its vast financial

The Japanese government will have to develop a

regional view independent of its domestic interests if it
is to assume the mantle of leadership in the next long
cycle.
It is possible a "Pax Niponnica" will occur.

The

Japanese government will assume the role of global
economic leader.

This will be brought about by the

superpowers bankrupting themselves in an arms race.

Once

this occurs, Japanese industry and trade will shape how
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the world develops as the strength of Japan in those areas
will allow it to dictate non-military solutions to world
problems.
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Japan has the same characteristics which

allowed the United States to dominate the twentieth
century:

(1) a large export surplus,

capital,

(3) industrial leadership,

(2) vast amounts of
(4) technological

supremacy, and (5) military strength.
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Additionally, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone even
admitted "the Pacific is an inevitability" and Japanese
newspaper editorials discussed internationalizing as early
as 1987.
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Even a Nomura report compared the United

States-Japanese relationship to the United States-Great
Britain relationship of the early twentieth century, with
Japan emerging as the global intellectual and moral
leader.
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Given the nature of Japan's Pacific trade and the
evidence of prolonged decline and continued economic
malaise, the United States' government is no longer the
first rate power in the Pacific.

By failing to invest

time and capital in the Pacific to ensure its market
access, the United States' government faces a challenge
for the role of leader.

The Japanese government is

filling the void created by the United States'
government's economic decline in the Pacific.

Of course,

if the nature of change digresses from Modelski's

\
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model, another leader will emerge and a new model have to
be developed.
Based on economic factors,

it is possible the

Japanese government may assume leadership in a new long
cycle.

The Pacific may be the next arena of hegemonic

conflict.

The winner of this possible conflict may assume

the role of Pacific leader.

Investment, trade,

technology, and spending patterns shore up this point.
While it is also possible that the United States
could halt its decline and reemerge as the next leader in
the coming long cycle, evidence seems to indicate this
will not happen.

Finally, it is also possible that the

changes occurring at present may lead to the replacement
of the existing pattern of long cycles with a new pattern
of relationships.
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GLOSSARY

balance of trade— the value of imports and exports which
exists between two or more countries; when trade is
balanced it is in equilibrium; when trade is unbalanced a
surplus or a deficit will occur in the respective
state(s).

deconcentration— the fourth stage of Modelski's theory
of long cycles involving the breakdown of the
hegemonic power and the challenge posed by other
states for assumption of the leadership role still
provided, although less and less efficiently, by the
declining hegemonic power.

delegitimation— the third stage of Modelski's theory of
long cycles involving the appearance of reemerging
instability after a period of hegemonic peace and
stability; occurs due to the hegemonic power's
inability to meet world security and stability needs;
invalidates previous formula for providing stability.
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global war— trade and/or military conflict between
states which affects the world's political, economic,
and/or military security.

GNP— gross national product; the total value of the
goods and services produced by the residents of a
state during a specific period of time, usually a
year; used interchangeably with GDP (gross domestic
product).

world power— a state which, by virtue of its economic,
technological, and/or military power is able to
influence the political actions and decisions of
other states without actually using that power.

\
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